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In large parts of the contemporary Is-
lamic world, the local population is in-
creasingly facing competition between 
different transnational actors for imple-
menting their respective agendas. These 
agendas are often framed as legitimis-
ing legal templates and claim universal 
validity. In these competitive processes 
it is particularly the development or-
ganizations which vulgarize ideals of the 
western way of life and political-legal 
notions such as development, democra-
tization, good governance, sustainability 
and environmental protection. These organisations increasingly encoun-
ter, however, the repercussions of acts by transnationally active Islamic 
movements propagating a return to the roots of Islam in everyday life. 
The socio-legal consequences of the competition between transnational 
actors for control over local contexts have rarely been addressed and 
theorized, however. Legal anthropology is challenged, on the one hand, 
to develop a theoretical framework to address the issue of an increasing 
competition between transnational actors and, on the other, to analyse 
how discrepancies between different and contradictory approaches initi-
ate and inform local discourses on violence, conflict, resistance, and local 
identity. The analysis of a concrete constellation in rural South West Mo-
rocco exemplifies the relevance of the matter.1
The thesis in this article is that focusing on the competition between 
global players for local control reveals that competition accelerates the 
scalar dynamics in transnational-state-local interaction. It is argued that 
the rising degree of legal cross-referencing serves to boost the legal 
agency of local actors. The article suggests a concept of “empowered 
legal agency” achieved by an emphasis on socio-legal identity and local 
culture.
The local setting and its transnational interveners
Before referring to the concrete example, I shall briefly outline the 
situation in the rural Souss in Morocco and the intervening global 
players. The Souss is the area of the unique forestal ecosystem of the 
Argan forest and simultaneously an intensively used agrarian region. 
The majority of the Souss people are 
farmers and peasants and are organ-
ized in village communities. The village 
legal arena contains, under the um-
brella of state law, various constitutive 
legal components including habitual 
and various Islamic legal elements. In 
1998 a UNESCO Biosphere Reserve was 
established while, over recent years, 
agrarian production for the world mar-
ket has continuously been expanding. 
This combination attracts many tran-
snational development agencies and 
donor organizations, which propagate a sustainable development ap-
proach, environmental protection and the formation of civil society 
structures. A strongly antagonistic approach to intervening in local af-
fairs arrived with the Salafiyya, the transnational Islamic movement, in 
1999. The Salafis propagate an adjustment of all spheres of life towards 
their own idea of the one and only correct Islamic lifestyle, which entails 
a rigid perception of the basic religious principles. The thing that both 
types of global players, the secular and the religious, have in common 
is that they can rely on very few experts on the ground. Development 
agents running projects tend to be based at regional centres. They in-
struct and advise local personnel and act as consultants. Development 
agencies recruit most of their local employees among the young un-
employed intellectuals from the region with university diplomas. The 
Salafiyya is headed by a few religious leaders who transmit Salafi ide-
ology via Islamic schools in the towns. They send missionaries to the 
countryside for the mobilization of local adherents and assist with the 
formation of local supporters. The Salafiyya organized a regional char-
ity network of local Salafi cells, while development agencies worked 
towards self-help, organizing production cooperatives and sustainable 
forms of resource management.
Differences between the competing actors become particularly obvi-
ous when looking at their attitudes towards each other and their implicit 
mutual interpretation. Officially, development agencies are indifferent 
towards the religious sphere in Morocco, in general, and towards Islamic 
activism in the region in particular. The Salafiyya, in contrast, address the 
issue of development impacts and openly 
criticize effects they interpret as negative. 
They condemn western influence and warn 
against the destructive forces of transnational 
legal treaties and development cooperation. 
The Salafis characterize their intervention 
as integrated within a general discourse on 
growing tensions between western lifestyle 
and Islam. Thus, they contribute to an already 
ongoing debate in rural Morocco about the 
benefits and disadvantages of concepts of 
sustainable development in the kind of re-
source exploitation propagated by western 
development agencies. In contrast, when 
asked about their opinion on the increase of 
Islamic activism and the Salafi criticisms of 
the pagan neoliberal development agenda, 
the local Moroccan development brokers 
representing the German GTZ and Oxfam 
Canada denied even recognizing the exist-
ence of an Islamic opposition to their agenda. 
How the competitors act in a local context is 
accurately shown by the following ethno-
graphic example.
In Morocco, as elsewhere, Western development 
initiatives face increasing competition from 
transnationally active Islamic movements, 
thereby complicating the dynamics of 
transnational-state-local interaction. The 
author analyses these dynamics by focusing on 
the dilemmas that arose when, in his research 
site, a pious Muslim won a sum of money in 
the “Ramadan lottery” and was engulfed by 
contradictory transnational advice. Ironically, 
this competition between global players 
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The Ramadan lottery and contradictory transnational 
advice
In the “Ramadan lottery” in autumn 2005, a villager won a small sum 
of money. This became a big issue in the community. The man, a pious 
Muslim, was searching for advice on what to do with this money and 
raised the issue in the village cafe. A public debate was immediately 
sparked. According to local religious ideas, the money is impure be-
cause it comes from a lottery that is haram. For this reason, it would 
not make sense to invest the sum, because one must not benefit 
from haram money. This religious attitude has had a strong impact on 
local practice. The local grocer who had granted a credit to the man 
announced he would accept money for the redemption of the debt 
without hesitation, because that would not mean “investment.” This so-
lution would have been approved by the majority of the villagers. The 
argument was, firstly, that the interpretation of the grocer was convinc-
ing and, secondly, that it is good behaviour and fosters the traditional 
system of the local economy to pay a debt earlier than necessary once 
in a while.
The local model of economic cooperation enjoys a longstanding 
tradition and is perceived as an expression of local solidarity. Custom-
ary regulation has contributed much to the economic development 
of a local moral economy since the 1980s, which has been developed 
within the cash crop sector. The local credit system allowed for the 
reinvention and financial hedging of sharecropping arrangements. 
Thus, sharecropping basically relies on a local legal arrangement 
that includes the informal credit system because the state legal order 
considers it an outmoded form of production, and Islamic law also 
expresses reservations regarding sharecropping. The local peasants 
prefer to raise credit during the period between sowings and harvest 
by a local grocer they trust. The grocers customarily only charge very 
low interest rates and are more interested in committing the debtors 
to their enterprise.
A local development broker completely disregarded all existing res-
ervations and proposed to the winning villager that he use his money 
for granting micro-credits to others, which would be a “good deed.” 
At the same time, the money would generate capital surplus, with 
which one could even increase the number of good deeds. Once fed 
in the circle of benefits, the money would be cleaned and no longer 
remain haram.
The man caused a great deal of consternation by putting forward 
this proposal. Micro-credits, previously introduced by external actors, 
had a poor reputation. They had been introduced as an instrument 
against rural poverty, and in order to strengthen self-help, and were 
widely promoted by development actors. The micro-credits were 
tied to specific small-scale economic enterprises as stipulated by the 
creditors—but the system was not under the control of its initiators 
for long. Alongside Moroccan organizations granting micro-credits 
on behalf of the transnational creditors, some black sheep appeared 
making credits available under extortionate conditions and for highly 
risky economic activities. The debtors realized too late what was hap-
pening and felt they were in serious trouble. Because of this, none 
of the villagers was prepared to act publicly against the prohibition 
on making a profit by exploiting the needs of members of the com-
munity.
The development expert’s further suggestions merely provoked 
the shaking of heads. He proposed investing the money in fencing 
the man’s plot in the forest with cacti lines, a favourite project of the 
environmental protectors. This is, however, against local law, because 
even plots where the holder is exercising exclusive exploitation rights 
must remain openly accessible, because pasture is a common right.
The Salafis, in turn, proposed transforming the haram money into 
halal money by way of the winner surrendering it to them as a charity 
donation (sadaqa). This was cause for common amusement. A sadaqa 
donation is defined as a voluntary pious donation to people in need. 
The act of giving sadaqa protects the giver against possessiveness 
and purifies his soul and his property and is agreeable to God. Ac-
cordingly, there is no need for an intermediary. But there was still a 
more concrete reason for the public reaction. In the village there is 
a Salafi grocer, not the lottery winner’s creditor, who is well known 
as an expert in “ritual transformative transactions.” The line of argu-
ment that he and his co-adherents put forward was not generally 
convincing, because they were perceived as pretending to transform 
all haram money into halal simply by investing it in the movements’ 
charity work. When making such investments, the grocer never shied 
away from cheating people, as he argued that they earned their 
money in a haram way and were, therefore, unable to give a sadaqa, 
which the grocer then offered to organize for them. Thus, the Salafis 
more or less embezzled haram money and invested it in the Salafi-
yya’s charity network in the previous owner’s stead, in order to pro-
vide the involuntary and deceived giver—and themselves—with spir-
itual remuneration. At the same time the grocer benefited from the 
donation itself because of the “financial reflux” from the recipients of 
charity. However, sadaqa brings spiritual benefits for the giver only if 
the donation is consciously made with good intent. As a result, few 
trusted this Salafi grocer, and his clientele was made up exclusively 
of his brothers in belief. In this particular case, when the Salafi grocer 
offered the same service to the lottery winner, the latter preferred 
to redeem the larger part of his debt and to remain loyal to his own 
grocer.
The implicit effect of these debates was that the villagers experi-
enced a growing external challenge to their local model of distribu-
tive obligations, which is based on ties of solidarity within the village 
and on mutuality between people living together. The Salafis criti-
cized the local credit system, while misusing it at the same time. This 
was because the powerful local social work and mutual aid structures, 
including redistributive rules, are deeply rooted in local religiosity 
and are connected with local religious rituals; and for this reason, 
the Islamic activists explicitly refused to contribute to it. The Salafi-
yya accepted only those distributive rules, which were in accordance 
with Islamic law such as zakat. An additional argument the Salafis 
employed was to contend that the local model of mutual material 
support simply balances out the lack of state assistance for social se-
curity. The development agents, on the other hand, emphasized that 
transnational financial support should be kept apart from local dis-
tributive obligations. They explicitly claimed that micro-credits and 
extra money for environmental protection measures should remain 
exempt from these obligations. Furthermore, the development agen-
cies overrode the conventional economic circles of good exchange 
and mutual support based on social and territorial proximity. How 
to profit from the investments all transnational actors are offering 
without causing losses to the local economy and undoing local social 
cohesion remains a matter of considerable debate.
The example reveals that the local legal arena where rules are nego-
tiated is providing an indispensable frame of reference for local iden-
tity interacting with and sometimes integrating or absorbing external 
impulses. The competitive nature of transnational intervention posed 
a challenge for local cohesion that was new in terms of both its qual-
ity and its intensity. Local people acted as members of village-NGOs, 
production cooperatives, or religious movements in order to access 
external resources. This provoked serious misunderstandings regard-
ing the judicial competence and intervention potentialities of these 
new institutions in local areas of conflict. 
The most pressing and challenging task in the discursive process 
turned out to be the re-evaluation of criteria of local identity and 
local belonging—which in turn had consequences for the local con-
figuration of economic power-relations. The informal village councils 
intensively discussed the implications of the various legal repertoires 
for local identity formation. The ability of local actors to canalize 
transnational interventionism and to create sufficient room to play 
transnational actors off against each other has finally led to a social 
process that can be described as “empowering legal agency.“ This re-
action must not necessarily be interpreted as “taming globalization.” 
But identity and social belonging prove to be re-
silient, as well as indispensable, as the basis for 
maintaining trust and legal security in the face 
of external challenges. 
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